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ABSTRACT
Using the case study of new Canadians who support the annexation 
of Crimea by Russia, this paper shows how political convictions 
sometimes follow formation trajectories that are similar to those 
of experience-based spiritual beliefs. The paper contextualizes 
personal narratives of some Russians who once resided in 
republics of the former Soviet Union outside of Russia and who 
experienced social turmoil associated with the collapse of the 
Communist regime. It further provides comparative references 
to immigrants from the former Yugoslavia. KEYWORDS: Belief, 
Personal Narrative, Folklore and Politics
When Russian military troops entered Crimea in February 2014, 
social media became a battlefield between pro-Ukraine and pro-
Russia supporters.1 I unwittingly provoked a battle of my own 
by naively posting letters on Russian-language forums, call-
ing upon Russians residing in North America to contact their 
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embassies and condemn their country’s military intervention 
in Ukraine. Although I had lived in Canada for over a decade 
by the time of this event, I am a native of Ukraine so shared 
feelings of devastation and uncertainty with a majority of my 
compatriots the world over. I realized, however, that some of 
my Russian readers may have different opinions on Ukraine’s 
political path, since Ukraine itself was not politically uniform. 
While the majority of the country’s citizens supported poten-
tial ties with Europe, many others, including most Crimeans, 
favoured integration with Russia. Understanding these com-
plexities, I attempted to avoid any overt political statements, 
suggesting only that diplomacy was a better means of resolving 
political dispute than weapons. I assumed all would agree but, 
as it turned out, could not have been more wrong.
Many of my online interlocutors were fully convinced that 
the President of Russia was doing the right thing. Putin’s per-
ceived qualities, as emphasized by some of the forum partici-
pants, corresponded with the folkloristic understanding of the 
concept of “folk hero.” Refl ecting on literature regarding folk 
heroes, István Povedák summarizes that “heroes appear as a re-
sult of mass needs” and “they express and satisfy socio-cultural 
needs and desires generated from the bottom up” (2014:10). 
Hasan El-Shamy, among others, points out that folk heroes are 
associated with “heroic behaviors” that “include saving indi-
viduals and nations from destructive forces or leading them 
from danger” (2011:652). Such sentiments were clearly refl ect-
ed in my interlocutors’ remarks. For example, Nikolai, origi-
nally from Russia, mentioned: “Putin is my hero because of his 
smart foreign policies and his manly nature” (Nikolai, social 
media, referenced March 2, 2014).2 In another example, Bakir, 
a Russian immigrant from Azerbaijan, pointed out:
Today, Vladimir Putin’s politics are the only type of politics 
that are correct with regard to the West. Putin picked Rus-
sia up from its knees following the era of Yeltsin, who was 
a clown and a jerk, and who allowed the plundering and 
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humiliation of this great country. Russia is now once again 
feared. (Bakir, social media, referenced March 2, 2014)
The academic questions that arose from these discussions were 
informed by my initial emotional frustration. Considering that 
the majority of my interlocutors were skilled professionals 
(in fact, some of the most active contributors were employees 
of multi-national oil companies), their pro-Putin sentiments 
seemed paradoxical to me. These individuals chose to relocate 
to North America to pursue career options, financial opportu-
nities and social services that were unavailable in their home 
countries yet they simultaneously supported the politics of a 
Russian President whose views and intensions were sharply 
anti-Western. These individuals chose to live in a Western 
democratic society that promotes respect for international laws 
and treaties, yet they supported political and military moves 
by Russia that compromised the established international order. 
The annexation of Crimea was a violation of the 1994 Buda-
pest Memorandum on Security Assurance signed by the United 
States, Great Britain and Russia and further endorsed by France 
and China (Yekelchyk 2015:68). The Memorandum ensured 
Ukraine’s independence and territorial integrity in exchange 
for the elimination of the country’s arsenal of nuclear weapons 
(Yekelchyk 2015:68).
Discussing the Ukraine-Russia crisis with some Russian 
friends was especially upsetting. Though they themselves had 
never been to Ukraine, they appeared to have no interest in 
my point of view, and instead unquestioningly accepted in-
formation from Kremlin-sponsored news outlets. My attempts 
to engage in constructive discussion were met with increased 
aggression. The most hurtful moment occurred when a close 
friend cut all ties not only on social media but also in real life. 
This affected not only us but also our children. I had to fi nd 
words to explain to my then four-year old son why he could no 
longer see his best friend. To my former friend, my condem-
nation of Putin’s actions meant my support of the Ukrainian 
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radical nationalist forces that, in her opinion, intended to de-
stroy the Russian population of Ukraine.
My friend’s sentiments mirrored the way the annexation 
of Crimea was recurrently legitimized in Russian media. She 
and other participants continuously bombarded online forums 
with news reports generated by those media as proof of the per-
ceived planned genocide of Russians in Ukraine, interpreting 
Putin’s moves as a noble attempt to save his people. For exam-
ple, on March 3, 2014, Nikolai posted thirty-three links from 
Russian sources as, what he considered, clear evidence of these 
intentions. In another example, Viktor, originally from Estonia, 
described his North American friends who had family residing 
in eastern Ukraine. According to Viktor, “they want to live in 
Ukraine today, tomorrow and so on… but not be robbed, killed 
or raped” (Viktor, social media, referenced March 3, 2011). My 
Russian interlocutors, who appeared to be well adjusted in the 
West and fl uent in English, refused to engage with political per-
spectives other than those of the Kremlin.
The fi gure of Vladimir Putin has gained a growing amount 
of academic attention, including studies devoted specifi cally to 
his image as a heroic leader. Such works focus predominantly 
on the political and socio-cultural implications behind image 
production processes in mass media as well as in elite, popular 
and consumer culture (e.g., Cassiday and Johnson 2010; Gosci-
lo 2013). They also tend to concentrate on the voices of political 
activists (e.g., Sperling 2015). I propose to expand a scholarly 
understanding of political heroisation by approaching it from a 
different angle, namely, the ethnography of the lives of regular 
people, including their responses to hero production processes.3
R E S E A R C H  M E T H O D O L O G Y
This study includes an autoethnographic component as it at-
tempts to “connect the autobiographical and personal to the cul-
tural, social, and political” (Ellis 2004:xix). It is also informed 
by “virtual ethnography” as defined by Christine Hine (1994; 
2000). I reviewed the discussions in the above-mentioned and 
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similar online social venues. Understandably, “[v]irtual eth-
nography is necessarily partial” (Hine 2000:65). It informs us 
with “ideas of strategic relevance” but does not provide room 
for holistic contextualization (65). While this method allowed 
me to identify distinct patterns in Russian immigrants’ political 
convictions, it also left some gaps.
I attempted to fi ll these contextual niches with what Hine 
labels as “conventional ethnography” (1994). Some online par-
ticipants were friends and acquaintances who I had met in vari-
ous parts of Canada. Others were contributors to my fi eldwork 
project devoted to immigrants from the former Socialist Bloc 
to the Canadian island of Newfoundland, the province of New-
foundland and Labrador. Newfoundland is widely perceived as 
a culturally homogeneous place, whose residents are predomi-
nantly of English and Irish decent. Its unique cultural setting 
and small immigrant population infl uences diaspora dynamics 
that are different from those that can be observed in places with 
large newcomer communities. For instance, Newfoundland’s 
context stimulates new Canadians to expand the notion of “their 
people” beyond a single ethnicity or country of origin.4 Given 
that sometimes as few as one or two families represent a par-
ticular ethnicity or country on the island, newcomers often seek 
contacts on the basis of a common historical and cultural past. 
One can frequently fi nd immigrants from multiple post-Social-
ist states, including former Soviet republics such as Azerbaijan 
and Estonia that form the main focus of this paper, within the 
same walls, attending the same social gatherings.
I have had both personal and academic interest in these 
diaspora circles since the time of my arrival to Newfound-
land in 2011 and have participated in many community and 
private events.5 In addition to numerous informal conver-
sations with newcomers, I have conducted a number of in-
depth interviews.6 Political topics were addressed extensively. 
Both prior to the Ukraine-Russia crisis and after its onset, I 
was interested in how sociopolitical dynamics in their home 
countries infl uence the new Canadians’ identities. Russia, the 
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dominant political power of the former Socialist Bloc, and its 
current president Vladimir Putin were often discussed in our 
conversations. The present paper draws upon these fi ndings 
that, in turn, help to deeper contextualize some immigrants’
online voices.
As expected, newcomers’ political views are diverse and 
complex. I do not suggest that all Russian immigrants support 
the political moves of the current President of Russia. In fact, I 
met many individuals who sharply condemned Putin’s politics. 
Rather, I wish to shed light on one distinct pattern in the politi-
cal convictions of Russian immigrants. In particular, I focus on 
those many Russians who lionize Putin. Intriguingly, some of 
the most vocal individuals in this category previously resided 
in former Soviet republics outside of Russia.
While I engage with the voices of other individuals through-
out the paper, I choose two narratives—that of Irina from Azer-
baijan and that of Dasha from Estonia—as the main focus 
of my discussion. While recognizing their views as part of a 
broader pattern that, in turn, involves representatives of other 
former Soviet republics, I select the two stories for the follow-
ing (methodological) reasons. Irina and Dasha were engaged in 
the above-mentioned online debates more actively than other 
participants, providing very extensive comments. It was their 
comments that initially stimulated me to undertake a folkloris-
tic exploration. How could these two individuals produce such 
strikingly similar narratives about the Ukraine-Russia crisis (as 
we will see below), considering that they are originally from 
two different countries, live in two different parts of Canada, 
do not know each other, and shared their views on two different 
online platforms? Prior to the onset of the crisis, I had known 
Irina for two years, recorded one interview and had numerous 
private conversations with her outside of our online debates. 
Preceding the crisis, I had known Dasha for seven years and 
we had a very extensive online discussion that developed from 
her blog regarding the annexation of Crimea. My close per-
sonal acquaintance with these two individuals allowed me to 
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reveal meanings that I would not otherwise have been able to 
understand. Before I present Irina and Dasha’s narratives, let 
me highlight some important events that preceded the annexa-
tion of Crimea and triggered the expressions of pro-Putin views.
P R E C E D I N G  T H E  A N N E X AT I O N  O F  C R I M E A :  M A I D A N
The annexation of Crimea was preceded by mass scale pro-
tests in Ukraine that became commonly referred to as Maidan 
(Square) (protesters initially gathered in Kyiv’s Maidan Neza-
lezhnosti or Independence Square) and lasted from late Novem-
ber 2013 until the end of February 2014. The demonstrations 
began as a citizens’ reaction to an unexpected political move 
by then-President Viktor Yanukovych. Under pressure from 
Putin, Yanukovych decided to postpone the signing of a long-
awaited Ukraine-European Union association agreement (Mar-
ples 2015:9). Later, due to the government’s brutal reactionary 
responses to the protests, the focus of the Maidan shifted to 
the “innate and grotesque corruption of the ruling regime, of 
the prevalence of oligarchs who had enriched themselves at the 
expense of the state, and the lack of legal reforms” (Marples 
2015:10-11). The most tragic outbreak took place in February 
2014, when escalating physical violence resulted in the deaths 
of over 100 people. While the protesters predominantly threw 
stones and Molotov cocktails at the police, snipers responded 
by firing on the protesters with live ammunition. The orders 
to use deadly force are widely believed to have come directly 
from the Yanukovych’s government. Some reports state that 
snipers were instructed to not only fire upon the protesters but 
also to target members of the militia in an attempt to both cause 
uncertainty regarding the source of fire and to offer justification 
for forcefully removing protesters. In the ensuing confusion yet 
other reports suggested that both Russian agents and opposition 
forces had had a hand in the massacre (Marples 2015:11). The 
Yanukovych government eventually fell and the former Presi-
dent fled the country on February 21, 2014, finding asylum in 
Russia (Marples 2015:12).
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The Maidan protestors represented all strata of Ukrainian 
society—“elderly and children, urban and rural, among them 
leftists, feminists, nationalists, and LGBT activists” (Philips 
2014:415). Although Far Right political forces were present 
and remained very vocal throughout the period of the protests, 
their overall infl uence was rather marginal. As historian Wil-
liam Risch (2015) observes, this was especially made clear by 
the presidential (May 2014) and parliamentary (October 2014) 
elections following the Maidan. For example, in their respec-
tive presidential runs, Oleh Tiahnybok, leader of the nationalist 
Svoboda party, scored as low as 1.16 percent support while the 
Right Sector Party’s Dmytro Yarosh received only 0.07% of 
the vote (Risch 2015:142). Neither Svoboda nor Right Sector 
scored the minimum 5 percent required for their parties to hold 
seats in parliament (Risch 2015:143).
F A K E  N E W S  O F  R U S S I A
Although the Kremlin initially denied the presence of the Rus-
sian troops in Crimea, it eventually explained the annexation 
of the territory as necessary. The Russian government sug-
gested the potential outcomes of the Maidan to be threatening 
to the Russian/Russian-speaking population of the peninsula. 
While the Maidan was complex and multi-faceted, both politi-
cally and socially, in the Kremlin-sponsored media it was pre-
sented as a clear and straightforward phenomenon, portrayed 
as an extremist nationalist movement sponsored by the West 
that, in turn, wanted to disempower Russia. Even though, in 
reality, the influence of the Far Right was rather marginal, it 
[the Far Right] “served as a smokescreen” for Putin to an-
nex Crimea “under the pretext of ‘protecting Russians abroad’ 
from supposed virulently nationalist, ‘fascist’ Ukrainians” 
(Philips 2014:415).
Timothy Snyder, the renowned Yale-based scholar of East-
ern European history, in his discussion of the annexation of 
Crimea, defi nes Russian “fake news” as a “fi ctional text that 
pose[s] as a piece of journalism” (2018:11). “Fake news” of 
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this kind works effectively in what Snyder proposes to under-
stand as “the politics of eternity” that can be observed in Putin’s 
Russia (8). This type of politics “places one nation at the center 
of a cyclical story of victimhood,” where no one is perceived 
to be “responsible because we all know that the enemy is com-
ing no matter what we do” (8). Putin is an example of “eternity 
politicians” who “spread the conviction that government can-
not aid society as a whole, but can only guard against threats” 
(8). While studying its purposes, mechanisms, and historical 
roots, other scholars and journalists provide detailed analyses 
of Russian “fake news” under a variety of umbrella terms, in-
cluding “information warfare” (Darczewska 2014), “propagan-
da machine” (Herpen 2015), or simply “Russian propaganda” 
(Bardach-Yalov 2012; Gerder and Zavisca 2016).
The general phenomenon of “fake news” has recently en-
gaged many scholars, including folklorists, largely because of 
widespread use of the term by contemporary fi gures such as 
current US president Donald Trump. Lynne McNeill suggests 
that folklorists’ responsibilities regarding “fake news” should 
be twofold—“educating and informing others about the factual 
truth of a matter as well as the underlying cultural currents to 
which the false information is speaking” (2018:499). Also re-
lated to this idea is Andrea Kitta’s suggestion that we consider 
“fake news” as a system of belief. While focusing specifi cally 
on health-related matters, Kitta argues that fake news stories of-
ten “express already established beliefs and people share them 
because these stories already fi t into their belief system either 
because they already believe them or because they seem believ-
able, demonstrating a form of confi rmation bias” (2018:409). 
Social scientists Christopher Paul and Miriam Matthews fi nd 
confi rmation bias to be one of the most important factors that 
contribute to the success of specifi cally Russian “fake news” 
(Paul and Matthews 2016:6).
Considering that the phenomenon of Russian propaganda 
has generated a substantial amount of academic and media at-
tention, I do not engage extensively with the question of factual 
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truth, but focus instead on the contextual currents that make 
“fake news” from Russia a believable matter and a reliable 
source for some people. In line with the conventional folklor-
istic understanding that boundaries are barely clear when it 
comes to emic perspectives on “real and parody, rumour and 
truth, conspiracy and fact” (Mould 2018:373), I contextualize 
and analyze fl uidity between “fake news” and individual life 
experiences. This study pays particular attention to the process-
es of formation of pro-Putin beliefs that, I argue, follow trajec-
tories similar to experienced-based supernatural and spiritual 
beliefs. I understand belief broadly, as folklorist David Hufford 
describes as “the certainty that something is true” (1995:19).
R U S S I A N  V O I C E S  F R O M  A Z E R B A I J A N  A N D  E S T O N I A
Irina, a young woman originally from Azerbaijan, in response 
to my call to condemn Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine, 
pointed out that, in her opinion, Putin’s decision to send mili-
tary troops to Crimea was “the only way out of the situation that 
has occurred, because Russian troops will prevent a civil war” 
(Irina, social media, referenced March 2, 2014). She further 
reinforced her position by drawing parallels between the dis-
cussed situation in Ukraine and relatively recent events in her 
hometown of Baku, referring to a time immediately preceding 
the collapse of the Soviet Union. Irina witnessed an escalation 
in the conflict between Azerbaijanis and Armenians, when radi-
cal nationalist Azerbaijani groups committed atrocities against 
Armenians living in the city. In particular, Irina emphasized the 
dramatic clashes of January 1990, when Soviet military troops 
arrived in Baku to provide what she perceived to be noble hu-
manitarian aid in the context of criminal chaos:
I know history and personally witnessed certain events. 
On January 20, 1990, when the Russian [Soviet] troops 
entered Baku people also thought that it was an invasion. 
In fact, it is still widely presented as such today. However, 
if it was not for the army, the crowd that was looting and 
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killing the Armenians could have attacked the Russians as 
well. Thanks to the Soviet soldiers, we returned to normal 
life. (Irina, social media, referenced March 2, 2014)
Irina makes historic parallels between her concerns for her own 
people who were in need of defence in the context of the inter-
ethnic conflict in Azerbaijan and the current protection of Rus-
sians that, in her opinion, is required in Ukraine.
Similarities can be seen between Irina’s narrative and that 
of Dasha, a young female immigrant from Estonia. While dis-
cussing the situation in Ukraine in her social media post, Da-
sha repeatedly referred to the home country she left for North 
America ten years prior:
I understand very well exactly what the Russians in Crimea 
were afraid of. Moreover, I defi nitely know the situation 
the Crimeans would end up in ten or fi fteen years from 
now, had they not joined Russia today. One doesn’t need to 
consult a fortune-teller. They would be in the exact same 
situation the Russians found themselves in Estonia. They 
would have been in a shitty situation, to be honest. (Dasha, 
social media, referenced May 2, 2014)
While providing examples, Dasha was especially bitter as she 
shared the story of her mother, a speech pathologist employed 
by a Russian daycare in Estonia. According to Dasha, Estonian 
law required daycare workers to pass an Estonian language test. 
Failure to achieve a passing grade resulted in an annual fine. 
“I am convinced that in a few years Russian speech patholo-
gists and daycare teachers in Crimea would be paying language 
fines in exactly the same way,” commented Dasha (Dasha, so-
cial media, referenced May 2, 2014). She continued:
Had Crimea not joined Russia, it would not only be peo-
ple of the older generation who would have encountered 
problems. Even ambitious and educated young Russian 
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speakers who knew the offi cial [Ukrainian] language and 
had Ukrainian citizenship, would have had it very-very 
diffi cult. They would have had to put their lives in order 
to prove that they were not Putin’s supporters and that 
they were not the hand of Moscow; that it’s not them who 
sent representatives of the [Ukrainian] nation to Siberia 
in the 1940s, […] not them, not them, not them […] In a 
Ukrainian Crimea, all Russians would have had to write 
this in capital letters on their foreheads. They would have 
had to write and highlight it ten times—the way it is writ-
ten and highlighted now on the forehead of every Russian 
in Estonia. (Dasha, social media, referenced May 2, 2014)
Dasha addresses dramatic moments in Soviet history, when 
many were persecuted for their political views, forcefully 
stripped of material possessions and exiled to concentration 
camps in Siberia. Dasha finds it unfair that the present-day gen-
eration of Russians in Estonia is widely viewed as responsible 
for the brutal deeds of their ancestors. Unlike Irina and other in-
dividuals quoted above, Dasha is not an uncritical fan of Putin. 
She even supported the Maidan at its initial stages. However, 
it is not Putin but her fellow Russians that constitute the main 
concern for Dasha. Thus, like Irina, she approves, albeit im-
plicitly, of Putin’s perceived mission to protect Russians living 
outside of Russia.
C O N T E X T U A L I Z I N G  P E R S O N A L  N A R R AT I V E S
Irina’s and Dasha’s historical references support sociologist 
Barbara Misztal’s remarks about memory, an entity that Misztal 
finds to be “intersubjectively constituted”:
[…] while it is an individual who remembers, his or her 
memory exists, and is shaped by, their relation with, what 
has been shared with others and that it is, moreover, al-
ways memory of intersubjective past, of a past time lived 
in relation to other people. (2003:6)
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Through personal narratives, Irina and Dasha present their in-
dividual memories of the life Russians shared with the titular 
ethnic groups in Azerbaijan and Estonia. Folklorist Sandra 
Stahl, one of the pioneers in the study of personal experience 
narratives, points out that “[t]he personal narrative seems the 
ideal vehicle for expressing ‘attitude’” and “the attitude is what 
gives the narrative its meaning” (1977: 22). Somewhat in line 
with Misztal’s argument, Stahl further expands: “[n]evertheless, 
no attitude itself will exist independently, idiosyncratically: it 
will always be shared by group members, varying only in the 
degree of relative importance each individual personality af-
fords it” (1977:22).
Folklorist Elliott Oring calls upon the signifi cance of exam-
ining the “structures, meanings and functions” of narratives in 
relation to their larger four contexts—cultural, social, individ-
ual and comparative (1986:135). Although Oring’s focus is on 
traditional (formulaic) forms of narratives such as myth, legend 
and tale, his idea of the four contexts as important background 
factors that reveal deeper meaning can be applied to personal 
experience narratives as well. It is also important to keep in 
mind that, as anthropologist Marita Eastmond states, personal 
experience narratives “cannot be seen as simply refl ecting life 
as lived, but should be seen as creative constructions or inter-
pretations of the past, generated in specifi c contexts of the pres-
ent” (2007: 250). In light of these studies, let me further address 
the larger past and present-day contexts of Irina’s and Dasha’s 
personal narratives. These contexts, in turn, will shed light on 
the formation of their “attitudes” regarding the present-day cri-
sis between Ukraine and Russia.
R U S S I A N S  A N D  T H E  C O L L A P S E  O F  T H E  S O V I E T  U N I O N
While all citizens of the former USSR were affected by the col-
lapse of the Soviet system, some ethnic Russians experienced 
a very intense shift. As numerous studies by historians, soci-
ologists and political scientists inform us (e.g., Shlapentokh et 
al. 1994; Kolstoe 1995; Chinn 1996; Lapidus 1996; Lebedeva 
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1997; Savoskul 2001; Kolstoe 2001; Lauristin and Heidmets 
2002), many Russians faced deep social trauma in the late So-
viet—early post-Soviet period. Even though official Soviet po-
litical discourse promoted internationalization and the equality 
of all Soviet people, in reality there was a clear hierarchy where 
Russian culture occupied the dominant position. To provide just 
one example, Russian was the main language of the entire So-
viet Union while other languages had secondary status. It was 
neither mandatory nor necessary for a Russian to learn another 
language even if he or she lived outside of Russia.
This situation changed in the context of the nationalization 
processes that took place in the former republics in the late So-
viet and early post-Soviet period. As many as 25 million Rus-
sians living in countries of the former Soviet Union but outside 
of Russia (such as Irina’s and Dasha’s families) were suddenly 
part of the minority. They found themselves inside new interna-
tional borders that had been imposed on them externally (Kol-
stoe 1995). In other words, these Russians were transformed 
from representatives of the dominant nation, who had felt at 
home anywhere within the Soviet Union, into diaspora com-
munities (Kolstoe 1995, 2001; Lauristin and Heidmets 2002). 
However, even though Russian minorities shared many experi-
ences across all former Soviet republics, there were also sig-
nifi cant differences. Nationalization processes acquired contex-
tually specifi c forms and took place with varying degrees of 
intensity in different former Soviet republics.
R U S S I A N S  I N  A Z E R B A I J A N
The conflict in Azerbaijan that Irina addresses saw the loss of 
many lives and was politically complex. Irina’s brief reference 
does not, of course, cover its full complexity. Neither, as we 
will see below, does it match leading academic interpretations. 
It is beyond the scope of this work to provide a detailed his-
tory of the conflict, especially considering that it has received a 
substantial amount of academic attention (e.g., Croissant 1998; 
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Cornell 1999; Waal 2003; Geukjian 2012). Instead, I highlight 
some aspects that relate to the present study.
The late Soviet and early post-Soviet confl ict between 
Azerbaijan and Armenia centred around Nagorno-Karabakh, a 
region in Azerbaijan populated predominantly by ethnic Arme-
nians. In order to understand the nuances of antagonism be-
tween these two Caucasian peoples, one needs to consider the 
millennia-long historical and cultural formation processes of 
what is now Armenia and Azerbaijan (Dragadze 1989:58-70). 
Understandably, both Azerbaijani and Armenian academics 
each present their own emotionally charged versions of their 
countries’ histories and identities, each claiming Nagorno-
Karabakh as their territory (Croissant 1998:10-13). Outside 
scholars insist that the population of the southeast Caucasus 
was always mixed, with no historical basis to indicate that it is 
exclusively Azerbaijani or Armenian or that it can even be split 
between the two groups (Croissant 1998:12).
During the Soviet era, while some tensions between the 
two ethnic groups existed, neither side experienced any open 
violence and “intercommunal relations were good” (Waal 
2003:100). However, the late Soviet democratization poli-
cies of General-Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev created fertile 
ground for increased Armenian efforts toward making Nago-
rno-Karabakh part of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic 
(Dragadze 1989:55; Geukjian 2012:129-44). As Moscow ini-
tially remained relatively passive regarding the issue, clashes 
between Azerbaijanis and Armenians continued to escalate in 
the late 1980s. One of the most dramatic riots took place in late 
February 1988 in the city of Sumgait, located approximately 
thirty kilometers from Baku. Numerous brutalities, organized 
predominantly by young Azerbaijani men, were reported, in-
cluding violent acts against Armenian women in a maternity 
hospital (Dragadze 1989:56).7 The pogrom that targeted the Ar-
menians of the city is considered to be the main trigger for the 
subsequent full-scale war in Nagorno-Karabakh.
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Another dramatic major event that took place in the context 
of the growing confl ict between the two countries is described 
by Irina in her narrative. The month of January 1990 was 
dubbed “Black January,” as Soviet troops took control of Baku 
“after a fi ve-hour battle that left more than a hundred Azeris 
dead and over a thousand wounded” (Croissant 1998:37). Un-
like Irina, political anthropologist Tamara Dragadze, among 
others, does not believe that Soviet troops arrived in Baku to 
perform a humanitarian task. Based on remarks made at the 
time by some military offi cials, Dragadze insists that this was, 
rather, Gorbachev’s attempt to uphold Soviet power, especial-
ly considering that the operation took place several days after 
the last Armenians had left Azerbaijan (Dragadze 1996:281). 
Many scholars are unanimous in their assessment of the effect 
of “Black January” on Azerbaijan’s future relationship with 
the Soviet Union. The appearance of Soviet tanks, operated 
by Russian soldiers, that indiscriminately killed and wound-
ed people meant the end of the Soviet system in Azerbaijan 
(Dragadze 1996:281).
In her narrative, Irina does not engage with these complex 
historical matters. Rather, she tells her personal story—that of 
an ethnic Russian who, while residing in Azerbaijan at the time, 
was caught in the middle of the inter-ethnic clash. For Irina, 
the Soviet troops were saviours who prevented anyone from 
potentially getting to her people. Even though Azerbaijanis and 
Armenians were the main groups involved, the crisis deeply af-
fected Russians as well. Irina’s fear and discomfort is refl ective 
of broader sociological fi ndings on the situation of Russians in 
Azerbaijan around the country’s escalated crisis with Armenia. 
Reportedly, as many as 195,000 or nearly 50% of 392,000 Rus-
sians who resided in Azerbaijan as of 1989, left the country 
between 1989 and 2002 (Heleniak 2004:109).
During an informal conversation, Irina recalled a personal 
incident that occurred in Baku shortly after the collapse of the 
Soviet regime. She was riding the bus while in the latter stages 
of pregnancy. The bus was crowded, but no one offered her a 
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seat. According to Irina, the reason was that her Slavic (white) 
appearance was different from that of the indigenous popula-
tion. Irina now feels very nostalgic for the Soviet times because, 
as she says, “there were no nationalities in the Soviet Union.” 
She believes that the collapse of the Soviet Union brought 
about national divisions and confl icts. She, of course, speaks 
from the point of view of a representative of the dominant Rus-
sian culture.
R U S S I A N S  I N  E S T O N I A
In her narrative, Dasha addresses the complex situation of 
Russians residing in Estonia. While Azerbaijan’s Soviet his-
tory began in 1922, Estonia was annexed by the Soviet Union 
much later, in 1940. Since that time anti-Soviet and, by exten-
sion, anti-Russian sentiments, have been prominent in Estonia, 
the result of numerous brutalities and hegemonic policies of 
the Soviet regime that are still within the living memories of 
many Estonians. For example, the early Sovietization process 
included the expropriation of private property and deportations. 
Accounts report that on the night of June 14, 1941, over ten 
thousand people were forcibly “sent to Siberia in cattle cars” 
(Kionka and Vetik 1996:132-33). In another example, the cul-
tural dimensions of Estonian anti-Russian sentiments increased 
by the 1970s, especially as a reaction to an official Soviet policy 
regarding the increased promotion of the Russian language in 
non-Russian republics of the USSR. As Russian became more 
widely taught at Estonian schools in 1981, many Estonians 
viewed this as a great threat to their cultural identity (Kionka 
and Vetik 1996:133). The Estonian language was also pushed 
to the margins in professional spheres, including civil aviation 
and the merchant navy, for example (Vetik 1993:274).
As was the case in other Soviet republics, Gorbachev’s late 
Soviet democratization endeavours created the fertile ground 
for independence-related initiatives in Estonia. Fortunately, 
unlike in Azerbaijan and some other former Soviet republics, 
including neighbouring Latvia and Lithuania, Estonia gained 
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independence from the Soviet Union without bloodshed. The 
Russian population of Estonia found itself in a diffi cult situ-
ation following the declaration of independence. The status 
of immigrants who came to the country during the Soviet era 
became one of the most controversial issues facing the new 
democratic government. In 1992, the government reenacted 
Estonia’s 1938 citizenship law, and only those who had resided 
in Estonia prior to the Soviet occupation and their descendants 
could be recognized as citizens (Kionka and Vetik 1996:142; 
Kolstoe 1995:120-21). Thus, the post-war immigrants, who 
initially believed that they had simply moved to another part 
of their own country—the USSR—were now “considered il-
legal immigrants or occupants” in post-Soviet Estonia (Kolstoe 
1995:112). Three years of residence in the country and some 
knowledge of the Estonian language were mandatory for one 
to become eligible for citizenship. These new requirements ap-
plied not only to potential newcomers but also to those non-
Estonians who had been residing in Estonia for years prior to 
independence (Kionka and Vetik 1996:140-42).
It is not surprising that such changes deeply affected the 
Russian population of Estonia who, in 1989, shortly before 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, had represented slightly over 
30% of the country’s total population (Sencerman 2016:100). 
The Estonian government undertook a number of further steps 
to ease growing ethnic tensions. One example was the Law on 
Local Elections that was adopted in 1993. The right to vote 
was given not only to the citizens of Estonia but also to those 
non-Estonian nationals who had resided in particular election 
areas for fi ve years preceding the election (Kionka and Vetik 
1996:143).
Comparative politics scholar Raivo Vetik (2011), while re-
viewing the growing body of academic literature on Estonian 
integration policies, fi nds the literature to range from optimistic 
to very critical. Some academics insist that the need to address 
the concerns of the new Russian minority “has accelerated the 
transformation of Estonia from an ethnic nation (characterized 
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by the historically dominant position of defensive nationalism) 
to a modern civic nation” (Lauristin and Heidmets 2002: 20; 
see also Vetik 2011: 40). However, Vetik fi nds that many oth-
er authors do not share such an optimistic view. For instance, 
Vello Pettai and Klara Hallik, while analyzing the most recent 
integration policies implemented by the Estonian political elite, 
go so far as to argue that “the aim is still to help non-Estonians 
join an Estonian-defi ned nation-state” (Pettai and Hallik 2002: 
507; see also Vetik 2011: 41).
Clearly, Dasha’s sentiments are in line with the latter, more 
critical interpretations of the situation of Russians in Estonia. 
Olga, an older Russian also from Estonia, who has lived in 
Canada for the last twenty years, shed more light on Dasha’s 
views (Olga, interviewed by M. Lesiv, October 5, 2018). She 
related numerous personal experience accounts illustrating 
ethnic tensions in the country. One of her stories involved a 
former co-worker, an elderly Estonian who, according to Olga, 
was an aggressive Russophobe. The co-worker and her family 
had been exiled to Siberia at some point in the past. This co-
worker would occasionally bring to work old photographs that 
refl ected her family’s wealth and well-being in the pre-Soviet 
past. She would show the phonographs to Olga and would say 
angrily, “Look what you’ve done!” The Estonian co-worker 
viewed Olga as complicit in the Soviet atrocities and as part of 
the collective Russian enemy. This example closely resonates 
with Dasha’s descriptions of Russian experiences in Estonia 
that, in turn, led to her fear for the future of Russians in Crimea, 
had the peninsula not become part of Russia.
Even though Olga has never been supportive of the Soviet 
regime, had joyfully celebrated its collapse and has a complex, 
rather than polarized, view of the present-day crisis between 
Ukraine and Russia, what she shares with Dasha is the view 
of Russians as a suppressed segment of Estonia’s present-day 
population. According to Olga, while tensions in Estonia have 
always existed, they signifi cantly increased in the late Soviet—
early post-Soviet period. It was these tensions that infl uenced 
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Olga’s decision to leave Estonia twenty years ago. During a 
recent visit to her home country, she met an old friend. De-
spite the fact that the friend and her family are economically 
successful and own several businesses, they still regret not 
leaving Estonia. They continue to feel social discrimination. 
The only factor that helps is that their adult Estonian-born 
daughters have native fl uency in Estonian. As a result, the 
daughters take responsibility when it comes to important 
business-related tasks.
P A R A L L E L  N A R R AT I V E S
The lives of Russian minorities in late Soviet—early post-
Soviet Azerbaijan and Estonia displayed contextually specific 
differences, despite many commonalities. However, neither 
Irina nor Dasha appear to consider any such differences while 
reacting to the annexation of Crimea. Intriguingly, Dasha 
openly admitted that she did not have much knowledge of 
Ukraine’s history with Russia. She talked exclusively through 
the prism of Estonia, and did not take into account Ukrai-
nian contextual complexities that may not necessarily mirror 
those in her home country. Neither did Irina. Both individu-
als instead presented what I propose to understand as parallel 
narratives that exist alongside dominating and more widely 
accepted stories. In Irina’s and Dasha’s cases, their parallel 
narratives circulated alongside the dominating political points 
of view conveyed by the majority of the media in the demo-
cratic world, strongly condemning the annexation of Crimea. 
Parallel narratives communicate one’s own reflections on a 
particular event or situation and its potential outcomes. How-
ever, the reflections are not based on a careful examination of 
that event or situation in its own context. They are, instead, 
grounded in the narrator’s personal experiences involving in-
cidents that may appear to be similar.
Some basic facts indicate that the situation of ethnic Rus-
sians in Ukraine cannot be easily equated with that of their coun-
terparts in Azerbaijan and Estonia. One of the most obvious
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factors is that Russians do not represent a visible minority in 
Ukraine as they do in Azerbaijan. Discrimination on the basis 
of one’s physical appearance is not a signifi cant factor.
While Ukraine has undergone its own nationalization pro-
cesses, post-Soviet ethnic controversies had not reached the 
same degree of intensity as they had in other former Soviet 
republics, including Azerbaijan and Estonia, prior to the an-
nexation of Crimea. This can partly be explained by Ukraine’s 
close cultural and geographical proximity to Russia (Kolstoe 
1995:166). Even the ongoing tensions regarding the status of 
the Ukrainian and Russian languages in Ukraine (see Kolstoe 
1995:170-199 for details) cannot be equated with those in Es-
tonia. While the status of Ukrainian as the offi cial language 
may cause discomfort for some in Russian minority circles, 
knowledge of Ukrainian or the lack of it has never affected 
the citizenship status of those who relocated to Ukraine dur-
ing the Soviet era. Russian is still widely spoken in Ukraine. 
It was a commonly used language during the Maidan protests, 
especially in the movement’s epicenter in the predominantly 
Russian-speaking capital of Kyiv.
The cultural situations with the Russian language in Ukraine 
and Estonia are hardly comparable. According to Katja Koort 
(2014), Estonia is geographically, culturally, and linguistically 
closer to the northern Europe than to eastern Europe. The Es-
tonian language, as one of the most important identity markers 
in Estonia, is part of the Finno-Ugric language group and the 
Uralic language family. Thus, Estonian is distantly removed 
from Russian, which belongs to the Slavic group of Indo-Euro-
pean languages (Koort 2014:67).
To return to Dasha’s narrative, it is now clear that her moth-
er’s struggle with the Estonian language test may not have 
much to do with the mother’s unwillingness to learn Estonian, 
as I initially thought. It may, rather, be connected with her dif-
fi culties to embrace a very different linguistic system at a later 
stage in life. In contrast to the situation in Estonia, similarities 
between Ukrainian and Russian, languages that share common 
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Slavic roots, make it possible for nearly all citizens of Ukraine 
to understand both languages, with many Ukrainian citizens 
fully bilingual. A linguistic struggle of the Estonian intensity 
does not coincide with the reality in Ukraine. Similarly, Rus-
sians in Azerbaijan constitute a more pronounced linguistic 
and cultural “other” than their compatriots in Ukraine. Despite 
these and other obvious differences in the situations of Rus-
sians in the former Soviet republics, I was unable to convince 
my online interlocutors to look at Russians in Ukraine through 
the lens of the specifi cally Ukrainian contextual realities.
E X P E R I E N C E -B A S E D  P O L I T I C A L  B E L I E F S
There are numerous reasons explaining why Russian govern-
ment-controlled propaganda is very effective (see, for example, 
Paul and Matthews 2016). In Russia, its effectiveness is rein-
forced by the Kremlin’s growing suppression of independent 
democratic media and citizens’ access to information. This, 
however, should not apply in the same way to my interlocu-
tors, the majority of whom are educated professionals, fluent in 
English and with access to multiple sources of information in 
North America.
The roots of pro-Putin views are often addressed in rela-
tion to the Russian imperialist mentality. While I can recognize 
the imperialist undertone in the narratives of Nikolai and Bakir 
quoted earlier, I do not perceive the same sentiments coming 
from Irina and Dasha. Their narratives (as well as those of Vik-
tor introduced earlier) expressed genuine concern for their Rus-
sian compatriots.
Folkloristic scholarship focusing on supernatural belief, 
while seemingly unrelated to politics, can actually shed light 
on this political situation. David Hufford (1982) fi rst revealed 
the signifi cant role of physical experience in the formation of 
one’s beliefs. Hufford showed that some beliefs are not simply 
parts of irrational traditional worldviews passed down through 
generations, as was widely viewed by previous scholars, but, 
rather, are emergent and rationally develop from concrete 
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physical experiences, constituting part of what he calls the “ex-
periential source hypothesis” (1982) or “experience-centered 
theory” (1995). Hufford’s studies signifi cantly infl uenced oth-
er scholars’ approaches to spiritual and religious beliefs (e.g., 
McClenon 1995; Magliocco 2004: 95-121). Elsewhere (Lesiv 
2017), while discussing modern Ukrainian Pagan ideologies in 
relationship to nationalism and cosmopolitanism, I argue that 
pre-existing experience-informed beliefs regarding Russians as 
either blood brothers or blood enemies shape the religious cos-
mologies of today’s Pagans.
While expanding on a relationship between experience 
and belief, the present study is not related to things religious 
or spiritual but, rather, deals with purely political issues. It 
shows how a folkloristic approach can shed light on politi-
cal matters, illustrating that some political convictions follow 
trajectories of formation that are similar to those of experi-
ence-based spiritual and religious beliefs. It is not physical 
encounters (the focus of Hufford’s work) but social experi-
ences that play signifi cant roles in the formation of political 
beliefs. My interlocutors display fi rm beliefs that Russians 
are political victims, and these beliefs have rationally devel-
oped from their own experiences. Although triggered by the 
events in Ukraine, their comments are not about Ukraine and 
its internal and external crisis but, rather, about themselves—
traumatized Russians who felt they needed protection. This 
is why Irina’s parallel narrative is focused predominantly on 
the memories of her experiences as a Russian in Azerbaijan 
while Dasha’s is based on her and her family’s lives in Es-
tonia. These memories allow both individuals to rationalize 
that Russians in Ukraine would face exactly the same fate that 
they had endured in Azerbaijan and Estonia. Irina’s experi-
ence of “Black January” triggered fear of physical danger for 
her compatriots in Crimea, had it not been annexed and, thus, 
“saved,” by Russia. Considering her family’s experiences in 
post-Soviet Estonia, Dasha did not appear to be concerned 
about potential safety of Russians in Ukraine. However, she 
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expressed worries for the potential socio-political comfort of 
her compatriots in Crimea, had it not joined Russia.
Russians like Irina and Dasha, who became part of margin-
alized diaspora groups in their home countries due to the nation-
alization processes, have developed a need for protection, either 
consciously or sub-consciously. Now relocated to North Amer-
ica, these Russians have been displaced twice, living through 
the experience of what the Spanish studies scholar David Wacks 
has termed “double diaspora” (Wacks 2015). The two experi-
ences are not identical in their nature and dramatic intensity, of 
course. In the former case, Soviet Russians living outside of 
Russia did not physically relocate but were, rather, symbolically 
“displaced” by external political forces. In the latter case, they 
made a conscious choice to emigrate in search of better eco-
nomic and professional opportunities. Nonetheless, any reloca-
tion, especially when accompanied by cultural and linguistic 
adjustment, implies a move outside one’s comfort zone.
Many of my online interlocutors, whether explicitly or im-
plicitly, communicated varying degrees of nostalgia for the So-
viet Union, a place where Russians felt empowered and, thus, 
comfortable and safe. Their privileged position was shaken by 
the collapse of the USSR and their subsequent double diaspora 
experiences. Thus, these individuals understand the situation 
in Ukraine through the prism of their personal traumas and re-
sulting beliefs in Russians as victims. It is these beliefs that, in 
turn, make immigrants more easily susceptible to “fake news.” 
In fact, what is widely treated as “fake news” by outsiders, ap-
pears to be true and believable to my interlocutors from their 
emic perspectives because it resembles the realities of their 
lived experiences.
E T H N O G R A P H I C  D E T O U R :  E X P E R I E N C E -B A S E D 
B E L I E F S  I N  T H E  L A R G E R  P O S T -S O C I A L I S T  W O R L D
Experience-informed political beliefs do not appear to be lim-
ited to Russian immigrants but embrace the larger post-Com-
munist world. One example is the former Yugoslavia, where 
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Serbia’s position was similar to that of Russia within the USSR. 
With the collapse of the Communist regime, and the subsequent 
traumatic military conflicts including the Croatian war of Inde-
pendence, Yugoslavia underwent nationalization processes that 
resembled those in the Soviet republics. As a result, Serbs lost 
their privileged status. Thus, the political convictions of some 
Serbian immigrants display parallels to those of their Russian 
counterparts. When I asked Luka, my young male Serbian re-
search participant, if Serbian and Croatian, often referred to as 
Serbo-Croatian, are indeed the same language, he firmly re-
sponded: “Yes, it’s basically the same language” (Luka, inter-
viewed by M. Lesiv, January 30, 2018). Intriguingly, three of 
my young Croatian consultants, interviewed together, reacted 
to the same question very differently: “No, no,” they exclaimed, 
and then elaborated that while there are a large number of simi-
larities, the two languages are about 40% different from one 
another (Lesiv, fieldnotes, May 9, 2018). Luka’s view is very 
similar to that of Irina from Azerbaijan, who emphasized same-
ness by insisting that, “there were no nationalities in the Soviet 
Union,” communicating the position of the dominant power.
It may have appeared to Irina that there were “no nationali-
ties” in the USSR because most people spoke her language and 
were expected to embrace her Russian culture. As an ethnic 
Russian, she felt comfortable and safe in Soviet Azerbaijan, and, 
thus, feels nostalgic for the Soviet past. However, non-Russian 
ethnic groups were culturally and politically suppressed and, 
thus, tried to regain their unique ethnic identities during the 
post-Soviet nationalization processes. Similarly, as a represen-
tative of the dominant Serbian culture, Luka feels nostalgic for 
the former Yugoslavia. By stressing sameness between Serbian 
and Croatian, he symbolically communicates the pointlessness 
of the break-up of Yugoslavia. Intriguingly, even though Ser-
bian and Croatian are very similar,8 my Croatian participants 
emphasize difference. By doing so, they symbolically distance 
themselves from Serbs, attempting to escape the dominating 
powers of their own past.
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According to Luka, many in present-day Serbia view Putin 
as a hero, and this image of the Russian president is reinforced 
by the Serbian press. One of the messages disseminated by me-
dia outlets is that Putin will assist Serbia with powerful military 
weaponry to protect itself from NATO and the West (Luka, in-
terviewed by M. Lesiv, January 30, 2018). This is yet another 
example showing that some present-day political convictions 
have experiential roots in the past.
C O N C L U D I N G  R E M A R K S
Focusing on individual political voices from their emic perspec-
tives, this study reveals experient ial foundation in some pres-
ent-day political beliefs. The latter, I argue, sometimes follows 
formation trajectories that are similar to those of experienced-
based perceptions of the supernatural and the spiritual. In the 
cases of some Russian Canadians, it is their own memories of 
the late Soviet and post-Soviet context in their home countries 
that shape their inclination to believe “fake news,” blurring the 
boundary between reality and fiction. The media’s narratives 
bring immigrants the comfort of belonging to what they imag-
ine as the powerful nation of Russia ruled by a strong hero, 
and the sense of protection that they once lost. In order to be 
protected, there is a need for what Umberto Eco has famously 
termed the “invention of the enemy” (Eco 2013).
N O T E S
1 A signifi cant part of this research was supported by a 2017-2019 In-
sight Development Grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities 
Research Council of Canada (Grant File Number 430-2017-00006). 
Parts of the earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 2015 
International Society for Ethnology and Folklore Biannual Congress, 
the 2017 Folklore Studies Association of Canada Annual Conference, 
and the 2018 American Folklore Society Annual Meeting.
2 All communication involving Russian immigrants that is cited in 
this paper was in Russian. All translations from the original are by 
the author. Interviews with Serbian and Croatian immigrants were 
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conducted in English. Considering that this paper touches upon sen-
sitive political issues, all participants’ names have been altered and 
detailed identifying information, including the names of particular 
social media platforms where our discussions took place, has not 
been provided.
3 Folklorist Anastasiya Astapova uses a similar approach while tracing 
several patterns in vernacular responses to Belarusian President Al-
exander Lukashenka’s offi cial and unoffi cial biographies in present-
day Belarus (Astapova 2016).
4 While varying in their disciplinary approaches and particular focuses, 
a growing body of scholarly works on the topic refl ect the dominat-
ing tendency of diaspora groups to form on the basis of a single eth-
nicity or country of origin. Among many others, see Akenson (1996) 
for a discussion of the Irish diaspora in Canada, Australia, South Af-
rica, New Zealand, Great Britain and the United States; Bielenberg 
(2000) for accounts on the Irish diaspora the USA, Great Britain and 
the British Empire; Adachi (2006) for studies of Japanese diasporas 
in Manchuria, China, Canada, the Philippines, Singapore and Latin 
America; Isurin (2011) for the Russian diaspora in the USA, Ger-
many, and Israel; Satzewich (2003) and Khanenko-Friesen (2015) 
for studies of the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada; Köngäs-Maranda 
(1980) for an exploration of Finnish diaspora folklore in the USA; 
and Mehta and Singh (2008) for a study of diasporic Indians elderly 
in fi ve countries.
5 I have attended an Orthodox Christian Mission (that unites immi-
grants from post-Socialist countries where Orthodox Christianity is 
the predominant religion, including Bulgaria, Romania, Russia, Ser-
bia, and Ukraine) on a regular basis, approximately once a month. I 
have visited a local restaurant (owned by a Bosnian family), a major 
place of gathering for newcomers from the former Yugoslavia, on 
several occasions. I also attended and documented an annual New 
Year’s celebration (that drew Russian-speaking attendees from many 
former republics of the Soviet Union) in 2011 and 2012. In addition, 
I have participated in numerous private events organized by immi-
grants from the former Socialist Bloc.
6 I am grateful to all immigrants from the former Socialist Bloc who 
participated in this study, including those whose voices are not direct-
ly included in the present work, for sharing their thoughts, memories 
and experiences with me. To date, I have conducted 32 interviews 
with 41 individuals, ranging in length from one to four hours. While 
in this paper I rely on my own interviews and participant observation, 
I am thankful to Christina Robarts for her help at the earlier stages 
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of this research that informed my overall understanding of diaspora 
experiences. In Winter 2013, she conducted 11 additional interviews 
with East European immigrants in Newfoundland under my supervi-
sion as part of her placement work with the Heritage Foundation of 
Newfoundland and Labrador. I am also indebted to folklorist Dale 
Jarvis, for his initiatives and collaboration on this project.
7 See Shahmuratian (1990) for oral history accounts of the survivors of 
the Sumgait tragedy.
8 In addition to having had many private conversations with immi-
grants from the former Yugoslavia, I have formally interviewed ten 
of these newcomers. Regardless of their specifi c countries of origin 
and current political views, all stressed that there are no language 
barriers between the peoples of the former Yugoslavia, even though 
they speak languages that are identifi ed as different from one another. 
A Bosnian immigrant shared jokes about an interpreter translating 
languages spoken in the former Yugoslavia. Although the interpreter 
thinks highly of himself, he is in the butt of the jokes because each 
language shares numerous words that are identical and, thus, require 
no translation (Lesiv, fi eldnotes, March 1, 2019).
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